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Abstract
Floating Offshore Wind Turbines (FOWTs) operate in the harsh marine en-
vironment with limited accessibility and maintainability. Not only failures
are more likely to occur than in land-based turbines, but also corrective
maintenance is more expensive. In the present study, a mixed model and
signal-based Fault Diagnosis (FD) architecture is developed to detect and
isolate critical faults in FOWTs. More specifically, a model-based scheme is
developed to detect and isolate the faults associated with the turbine system.
It is based on a fault detection and approximation estimator and fault isola-
tion estimators, with time-varying adaptive thresholds to guarantee against
false-alarms. In addition, a signal-based scheme is established, within the
proposed architecture, for detecting and isolating two representative moor-
ing lines faults. For the purpose of verification, a 10MW FOWT benchmark
is developed and its operating conditions, which contains predefined faults,
are simulated by extending the high-fidelity simulator. Based on it, the
effectiveness of the proposed architecture is illustrated. In addition, the ad-
vantages and limitations are discussed by comparing its fault detection to
the results delivered by other approaches. Results show that the proposed
architecture has the best performance in detecting and isolating the critical
faults in FOWTs under diverse operating conditions.
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1. Introduction
The penetration of wind power into the energy mix has been significantly
growing over the past decade [1, 2]. In 2018, the global installed capacity
of wind energy reached 591,549MW worldwide [3]. Following in the path
of onshore wind exploitation, the developmentment of offshore wind energy
picks up the momentum in the race in transitioning from conventional fossil
fuels to renewable energy. In particular, offshore wind turbines are less in-
trusive from a visual and acoustic point of view, and guarantee much higher
and steady generation of power [4]. As the exploitation of offshore wind en-
ergy moves from shallow to deep waters, Floating Offshore Wind Turbines
(FOWTs) become the ideal alternative to replace the bottom-fixed turbines
and capture the abundant wind resources available over the deep sea [4]. Al-
though FOWTs are evidently advantageous from the public acceptance and
power generation point of view, designing, operating and maintaining them
pose a series of challenges:
1. FOWTs may experience unexpected faults and failures due to the com-
plex environmental loads, which would in turn lead to operation in-
terruption, economic losses and thus high Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) costs [5].
2. The reliability of FOWTs decreases with increasing turbine size and
complexity [6]. In particular, FOWTs tend to have larger rotor diam-
eters than land-based counterpart, and hence structural faults of the
rotor blade are more prominent in FOWTs.
3. FOWTs are usually situated in deep waters at a considerable distance
from the shore, which restrict their accessibility and maintainability
[7]. As a consequence, the O&M cost of a FOWT may account for as
high as 30% of the total life cycle cost [8], and also is an influential
factor in the determination of the turbine’s cost of energy.
To assess the reliability of wind turbines and to reduce the O&M cost, sev-
eral Fault Diagnosis (FD) architectures have been proposed in the literature
[9]. In general, FD architectures employ sensor data for detection, isolation
and identification of the faults in the wind turbine components, whose output
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can be used to implement fault tolerant control and condition-based main-
tenance [10]. Odgaard et al. [11] introduced a 4.8MW bottom-fixed wind
turbine benchmark in 2009. Using this benchmark, different FD approaches
were implemented and verified, including a Kalman filter combined with
a diagnostic observer approach [12], up-down counter [13], Gaussian-kernel
support vector machine [14] and estimation-based method [15]. These ap-
proaches were summarized comprehensively by Odgaard et al. [16]. In fact,
it has been found by Odgaard et al. [11] that most faults in the benchmark
can be detected successfully by the above mentioned approaches. Recently,
several attempts have been made to build FD architectures via alternative
approaches, such as interval observer [17], sliding mode observer [18] and
multi-physics graphical model [19].
Nevertheless, the existing FD architectures which have been developed
for land-based wind turbines can not be directly applied to the FOWT, the
reasons for this include:
1. There is no systematic study, to the best of authors’ knowledge, ad-
dressing prominent faults of FOWTs, such as structural faults of the
rotor blades and of the mooring lines. More specifically, the published
works mainly focus on the pitch system, gearbox, bearings, and electri-
cal system [11, 16] only. One plausible explanation might be that there
is currently no benchmark including the fault scenarios of the rotor
blades and mooring lines, nor those are implementable in widely-used
simulation packages such as Fatigue, Aerodynamics, Structures, and
Turbulence (FAST) [20].
2. The existing FD architectures are, in general, based on a simplified
model of the land-based wind turbine [11, 16], which lacks the descrip-
tions of hydro and mooring line dynamics. However, the dynamics of
the FOWT system are significantly influenced by the complex interac-
tions among the floating foundation, the mooring system, and the rotor
blades [21].
Therefore, it is urgent to develop an effective FD architecture for FOWTs,
considering the inapplicability of existing architecture, increased system size
and complexity of turbine-foundation interaction and reduced accessibility
for maintenance.
Recently, some preliminary efforts have been made to develop FD archi-
tectures for selected FOWT components. For instance, Ghane et al. [22]
utilized the statistical approach to detect and estimate the wear in the driv-
3
etrain of the 5MW spar-type FOWT. Cho et al. [5] used the model-based
approach to detect, isolate and accommodate the faults of the blade pitch
system of the same FOWT. Zhang et al. [23] employed the data-driven ap-
proach, namely random forests, to detect several actuator and sensor faults
of the 5MW semi-submersible FOWT. In spite of these designated contribu-
tions, relatively few studies addressed aforementioned challenges.
Considering the lack of systematic studies concerning the FD architecture
for FOWTs, the present study aims to develop an effective approach to detect
and isolate the fault of the FOWTs, and therefore contributes in the following
aspects,
1. Instead of considering one single component, e.g. blade pitch system
[5], of the FOWT system, a mixed FD architecture is developed in
the present study for the detection and isolation of faults in both the
turbine and mooring systems in FOWTs. In particular, the proposed
mixed FD architecture is established by integrating the model-based
scheme suggested by Ferrari et al. [24] with a signal-based scheme.
2. In order to verify the proposed architecture, a novel 10MW FOWT
benchmark is set up based on the DTU three-bladed variable speed
reference wind turbine and Triple-Spar floating foundation [25, 26].
Several critical fault scenarios including not only actuator and sensor
faults, but also structural faults of rotor blade and mooring lines, are
generated for the FD purpose. Particularly, the models of actuator and
sensor faults are extracted and improved from the models available in
the literature [16, 27].
In summary, the main contribution of this study is the FOWT-oriented
mixed FD architecture, which integrates model and signal-based schemes to
encompass most critical faults in FOWTs. Another novelty is the physics-
based FOWT benchmark. For the first time, a FOWT benchmark is es-
tablished for the purpose of developing and verifying a FOWT-oriented FD
architecture. In particular, the structural faults of the rotor blades and of
the mooring lines are taken into consideration.
From detecting and isolating the predefined faults in the developed 10MW
FOWT benchmark, the effectiveness of the proposed FD architecture is il-
lustrated. In addition, two classic fault detection methods are applied to the
10MW FOWT benchmark with predefined faults. The comparison concern-
ing the fault detection hence reveals the advantages and limitations of the
proposed mixed FD architecture.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the 10MW FOWT benchmark. In section 3, the overall structure and theo-
retical framework of the mixed FD architecture are presented. A case study
employing the proposed method to discern the faults of the newly developed
10MW FOWT benchmark is given in section 4. Then, its advantages and
limitations are discussed by comparing the detection results to other classical
approaches. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. Description of the 10MW FOWT Benchmark
In this section, the 10MW FOWT benchmark is presented. It is based on
the DTU three-bladed variable speed reference wind turbine and the Triple-
Spar floating platform [25, 26]. Particularly, several critical fault scenarios,
including not only the actuator and sensor faults, but also the structural
faults, are defined and implemented in the benchmark. The overview of the
FOWT is portrayed in Fig. 1 while its specifications are listed in Table 1.
For the purpose of developing the proposed mixed FD architecture, the
dynamics of the 10MW FOWT and of its actuators in state-space will be
described, by means of the following discrete-time system
x(k + 1) = A0x(k) + ρ(x(k), u(k)) + β(k − k0)×
φx(y(k), u(k), ϑx) + ηx(x(k), u(k), k)
y(k) = C0x(k) + β(k − k0)φy(x(k), ϑy)+
ηy(x(k), u(k), k)
, (1)
where k = 0, 1, . . . is the discrete time index and x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp
represent the state, the controlled input and the measured output vectors,
respectively. The contents of u and y are defined in Table 2. The matrix
A0 ∈ Rn×n and the vector field ρ : Rn × Rm 7→ Rn denote the nominal
linear and nonlinear parts of the FOWT healthy dynamics while C0 ∈ Rp×n
is the nominal output matrix. The unavoidable modelling uncertainties and
output disturbances are described by the functions ηx : Rn × Rm × R 7→ Rn
and ηy : Rn × Rm × R 7→ Rp.
The terms β(k − k0) × φx(y(k), u(k), ϑx) and β(k − k0) × φy(x(k), ϑy)
represent the dynamic changes of the state and output equation, respectively,
due to the occurrence of faults at the unknown time index k0, similarly to
the case reported by Ferrari et al. [24]. In detail, a fault class z = {z1, z2}
consisting of 5 process and 6 output fault functions will be considered, with
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Figure 1: Lateral view of the DTU 10MW wind turbine, of the TripleSpar floating platform
and indication of mooring line faults location.
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Table 1: Specifications of the 10MW FOWT (SWL: Sea Water Level).
Parameter Value
Turbine system
Rating 10 MW
Rotor orientation, configuration Upwind, 3 blades
Pitch control Variable speed, collective pitch
Drivetrain Medium speed, multiple stage gearbox
Rotor, hub diameter 178.3m, 5.6m
Hub height 119m
Cut-in, rated, cut-out wind speed 4m/s, 11.4m/s, 25m/s
Cut-in, rated rotor speed 6 rpm, 9.6 rpm
Rated tip speed 90m/s
Floating platform
Total height and draft 66m, 56m
Distance from the tower center-line 26m
Single column diameter 15m
Column elevation above SWL 10m
Elevation of tower base above SWL25m
Water displacement 29497.7m3
Mooring lines
Number of lines 3
Line angles from upwind direction 0 ◦, 120 ◦, 240 ◦
Water depth and anchor radius 180m, 599.98m
Fairleads above SWL 8.7m
Fairleads radius 47.181m
Line diameter 0.18m
Total length 707m
Mass/length in air 594 kg/m
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Table 2: Controlled and measured variables of the 10MW FOWT.
Variable Symbol Units
Control signals
Reference pitch angle θr ≡ u1 deg
Reference generator torque Tg,r ≡ u2 Nm
Measurements
Pitch angles θs ≡ ys, s = 1, . . . , 3 deg
Generator torque Tg ≡ y4 Nm
Rotor angular speed ωr ≡ y5 rad/s
Generator angular speed ωg ≡ y6 rad/s
Generator power Pg ≡ y7 W
Blade root bending moments1 Mcm,s ≡ y7+s, s = 1, . . . , 3 Nm
Tower top acceleration α¨ ≡ y10 m/s2
z1 being addressed by the model-based scheme, and z2 by the signal-based
scheme in the proposed mixed FD architecture:
z , {φy,1, . . . , φy,4, φy,7, φy,8 φx,5, φx,6, φx,9,︸ ︷︷ ︸
z1
φx,10, φx,11︸ ︷︷ ︸
z2
} . (2)
The details of each fault function in z are described in Table 3.
The parameters ϑy,l, l ∈ 1, 2, 4, 8 denote the scaling error magnitude for
sensors affected by the scaling type of faults, while ϑy,7 and ϑy,3 denote,
respectively, the stuck and offset value for these kinds of sensor faults. Sim-
ilarly, ϑx,5 and ϑx,6 denote the same for actuator type of faults.
The last three faults, described by φx,9 to φx,11, denote structural faults
that affect the nonlinear dynamic function ρ. In order to describe such
structural faults, the notations ∆ρ(x, u, ϑx,l) , ρ(x, u, ϑx,l)−ρ(x, u), with l =
9, . . . , 11, are introduced. They represent the change in the nonlinear part of
the dynamics from its nominal behaviour to a faulty behaviour characterized
by the parameter vectors of ϑx,l. These vectors contain specific values of
structural parameters which are caused by the structural faults.
1Mcm,s is the transformed symmetric moment of the s–th (s = 1, 2, 3) blade root via
the Coleman transformation [28], which transforms from a rotational coordinate frame to
a fixed one where all periodic parts vanish.
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Table 3: Fault types and functions.
Name Type Description Function
Sensor
f1 scaling Generator speed φy,1 = ϑy,1C01x
f2 scaling Generator power φy,2 = ϑy,2C02x
f3 offset Blade root bending moment φy,3 = ϑy,3e3
f4 scaling Rotor speed φy,4 = ϑy,4C04x
f7 stuck Pitch sensor φy,7 =ϑy,7−C05x−ηy,(5)
f8 scaling Torque sensor φy,8 = ϑy,8C06x
Actuator
f5 stuck Pitch actuator φx,5 = −u+ ϑx,5e5
f6 offset Torque actuator φx,6 = ϑx,6e6
Structural
f9 parameter Rotor blade sudden fault φx,9 = ∆ρ(x, u, ϑx,9)
f10 parameter Mooring line (fairlead) φx,10 = ∆ρ(x, u, ϑx,10)
f11 parameter Mooring line (anchor) φx,11 = ∆ρ(x, u, ϑx,11)
In particular, the faulty blade stiffness ϑx,9 = c · ϑ0x,9 is used to de-
scribe the abrupt rotor blade faults due to the effects of cracking, debond-
ing/delamination or fiber breakage [29]. In equations shown in Table 3,
0 ≤ c < 1 is a scale factor quantifying the reduction of the blade stiffness.
Usually, the stiffness reduction of the blade fault can be divided into three
stages [30]. The first two stages are attributed to non-severe blade faults with
a local stiffness reduction of around 0%−30%. They are caused by transverse
matrix cracks and debonding/delamination, respectively, which exert little
effect on the global bending stiffness. The third stage is severe blade fault
with a local stiffness reduction of at least 30%. It is mostly induced by the
local damage progression and the fiber breaking, and may have a significant
effect on the global dynamics of the blade. In this paper, only the severe
blade fault in stage 3 is taken into account for investigations.
In order to properly simulate the abrupt rotor blade faults, the corre-
sponding faulty mode shapes of the blades, which are dependent on ϑx,9, are
calculated using the tool Modes2 and fed into the FAST simulator. Note
2Modes: a simple mode-shape generator for towers and rotating blades.
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that the last two functions describe two critical mooring line faults (see Fig.
1) that may occur during the FOWT operation process [31, 32]. In detail,
the top segment fault at the fairlead will cause the mooring line to fall away
and reduce its tension ϑx,10 to zero. In the case of bottom segment faults,
the static friction forces from the seabed fail to keep the anchor in balance.
As a result, the anchor moves into a new equilibrium position where the
unstretched length ϑx,11 of the mooring line increases.
Based on the benchmark described above, the 10MW FOWT dynamics
are simulated by the FAST simulator with Simulink. In particular, all the
fault functions listed in Table 3, describing all the fault scenarios in z, are
included into the 10MW FOWT benchmark by extending the source code
of the FAST simulator. More importantly, critical parameters of the fault
functions, e.g. magnitude of the faults and changed mode shapes of the
blades, can be determined by users through an interface in Simulink, and
thereby fed into the FAST simulator for the fault generation. As presented
in Fig. 2, the lower part of the block diagram illustrates the developed
10MW FOWT benchmark. In addition, the well-known FAST numerical
package [20] is customized to include all kinds of faults and then simulate
the dynamics of a FOWT system containing specific faults. Furthermore,
the control laws which are based on Linear Time Invariant (LTI) dynamical
systems, are implemented in Simulink [25, 26].
3. Mixed FD Architecture for Floating Offshore Wind Turbines
In this section the overall structure of the mixed FD architecture is in-
troduced, which is depicted in the upper part of Fig. 2. The mixed FD
architecture includes a model-based FD approach in the time domain, which
follows the generalized observer scheme [33]. In detail, a Fault Detection
and Approximation Estimator (FDAE) is used to detect faults and activate
a bank of N Fault Isolation Estimators (FIEs), with N being the number of
the predefined faults. Fault decisions produced by the FDAE and the FIEs
are evaluated by a detection and isolation logic in order to produce a final
diagnosis.
For the purpose of coping with the faults associated with mooring lines,
which proved to be elusive for estimator-based detectors, the proposed mixed
https://nwtc.nrel.gov/Modes.
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the 10MW FOWT benchmark in the lower part and the overall
structure of the mixed FD architecture (eqs.(4)-(16)) in the upper part. A fault generator
block is added to allow introducing faults (Table 3) in actuators, sensors, rotor blades and
mooring lines.
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FD architecture includes as well a signal-based FD scheme in the frequency
domain. The signal-based scheme consists of a Short Time Fourier Trans-
form (STFT) step followed by a K–Nearest Neighbour (KNN) detection and
isolation step.
3.1. Model-based fault diagnosis for the turbine system
To detect and isolate the N = 9 faults belonging to z1, a bank of N + 1
nonlinear adaptive estimators is designed and implemented, each one yielding
an output estimate yˆl ∈ RM , l = 0, ..., N , where M is the size of the output.
The FDAE (l = 0) detects known faults and approximate unknown ones,
while the FIEs (l = 1, . . . , N), each corresponding to one fault in z1, are
designed to isolate the detected fault. For each l–th estimator a residual
signal is defined as
ry,l(k) = yl(k)− yˆl(k) . (3)
The healthy hypothesis (l = 0) shall be rejected by the FDAE if the ab-
solute value of at least one component ry,l,(i)(k) of its residuals, with i ∈
{1, . . . , ,M}, exceeds the corresponding one of a suitable time-varying thresh-
old, denoted as r¯y,l,(i)(k). The first such time will be indicated as the detection
instant kd. Similarly, each FIE (l = 1, . . . , N) will reject its own faulty hy-
pothesis if a component of its residuals will cross its threshold. If at some
time instant every hypothesis but the l–th one has been rejected by the FDAE
and FIEs, then the detection and isolation logic will conclude that the l–th
fault occurs.
3.1.1. FDAE and fault detection
The FDAE will be based on a linearized version of the nominal healthy
FOWT dynamics introduced in eq. (1). For time instants 0 ≤ k < kd, that
is before detection, it will be described by the following LTI system{
xˆ(k + 1) = Axˆ(k) +Bu(k) + L(y(k)− yˆ(k))
yˆ(k) = Cxˆ(k) +Du(k)
, (4)
where xˆ(k) and yˆ(k) are the predicted state vector and output, respectively,
and the FDAE input and output correspond to the same variables described
in Table 2. Following the block diagram introduced in the lower part of
Figure 2, the matrices A, B, C and D are obtained by cascading the LTI
systems describing the actuator dynamics [25, 26] with a linear model of the
turbine. Such a linear model is obtained by applying subspace identification
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[34] techniques to simulation data produced by FAST. It should be noted
that it is rather difficult to obtain a white-box model due to the nonlinear
dynamics of the FOWT [35], as detailed in Section 4. The matrix L ∈ RK×M
is the FDAE gain, which is chosen such that A0 , A− LC is stable. The
time-varying threshold r¯y,0(k) is then designed to bound the healthy residual
ry,0(k), in order to guarantee no false-positive alarms.
In detail, the i–th component r¯y,0,(i)(k) is calculated as,
r¯y,0,(i)(k) ,
k−1∑
h=0
α(i)δ
k−1−h
(i) [∆¯ρ(h) + η¯x(h)] + α(i)δ
k
(i)¯
0
x(0)
+η¯y,(i)(k), i = 1, ...,M ,
(5)
where two scalar constants α(i) and δ(i) are obtained as in [36]. η¯x and η¯y are
the bounding function of the uncertainties in the state and output equations
of the FOWT. The function ∆ρ represents the difference between the nominal
nonlinear healthy dynamics and the linear model:{
∆ρ(x(k), xˆ, u(k)) , ρ(x(k), u(k))− ρ(xˆ(k), u(k))
∆¯ρ(xˆ(k), u(k)) , max
x∈Rx
(‖∆ρ(x, xˆ, u(k))‖) . (6)
If the condition |ry,0,(i)(k)| > r¯y,0,(i)(k) holds for some component i at the
time instant k = kd, a fault is detected and the FDAE equation becomes
xˆ(k + 1) = Axˆ(k) +Bu(k) + L(y(k)− yˆ(k))+
φˆx,0(y(k), u(k), ϑˆ0(k))
yˆ(k) = Cxˆ(k) +Du(k) ,
(7)
where φˆx,0 is a general online estimator to learn unknown or unstructured
faults (such as the rotor blade sudden fault f9). For instance, φˆx,0 can be
based on a Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural network, whose parameters
are assumed to satisfy ϑˆ0 ∈ Θˆ0, where Θˆ0 is a user designed parameters
domain. In particular, Θˆ0 is chosen here to be an origin-centered hyper-
sphere with radius of MΘˆ0 .
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3.1.2. FIE and fault isolation
After a fault is detected at k=kd, the bank of FIEs is activated. The
actuator fault l–th FIE’s dynamics, for the actuator faults l = 5, 6 are,
xˆl(k + 1) = Axˆl(k) +Bu(k) + L(y(k)− yˆl(k))+
φˆx,l(y(k), u(k), ϑˆx,l(k))
yˆl(k) = Cxˆl(k) +Du(k)
, (8)
where φˆx,l(k) , col(φˆx,l,(i)(k), i = 1, ...,M) and ϑˆx,l(k) , col(ϑˆx,l,(i)(k)). Par-
ticularly, φˆx,l,(i)(y(k), u(k), ϑˆx,l,(i)(k)) , ϑˆx,l,(i)(k)Tgl(i)(y(k), u(k)) is a linearly
parameterized function. ϑˆx,l,(i)(k) ∈ Θˆl(i) denotes the parameter vector and
gl(i) is the fault-specific shape function. Θˆ
l
(i) is assumed to be an origin-
centered hyper-sphere with radius of MΘˆl
(i)
as well.
In order to learn the fault function of φx,l, the parameters of φˆx,l are
updated following the learning law,
ϑˆx,l(k + 1) = PΘˆl(ϑˆx,l(k) + γ
l(k)gl(k)CT rly(k + 1)) , (9)
where PΘˆl denotes the projection operator on Θˆ
l as
PΘˆl(ϑˆx,l) ,
{
ϑˆx,l , if |ϑˆx,l| ≤MΘˆl
(MΘˆl/|ϑˆx,l|) · ϑˆx,l , if |ϑˆx,l| > MΘˆl
. (10)
In addition, γl(i)(k) is calculated as,
γl(k) , µl/(εl + ‖gl(k)CT‖2F ), εl > 0, 0 < µl < 2 . (11)
Similarly, the dynamics of the l–th FIE corresponding to the sensor faults,
l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8}, are
xˆl(k + 1) = Axˆl(k) +Bu(k) + L(y(k)− yˆl(k))
yˆl(k) = Cxˆl(k) +Du(k)+
φˆy,l(x(k), ϑˆy,l(k))
, (12)
where φˆy,l(k) , col(φˆy,l,(i)(k), i = 1, ...,M) and φˆy,l,(i)(x(k), ϑˆy,l,(i)(k)) ,
ϑˆy,l,(i)(k)
Tgl(i)(x(k)).
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As each l–th FIE fault function matches the specific fault in z1, it is
possible to compute a dynamic threshold r¯y,l such that |ry,l,(i)(k)| ≤ r¯y,l,(i)(k)
under the hypothesis that the actual fault is the l–th one, for each i and k.
The thresholds for actuator faults are designed as
r¯y,l,(i)(k) = η¯y,(i)(k) + α(i)
{
k−1∑
h=kd
δk−1−h(i) {[∆¯ρ(h)+
η¯x(h)] + ‖gl(i)(h)‖[κl(h) + ‖ϑˆl(i)(h)‖b¯−(h−kd)]}+ δk−kd(i) ¯lx(kd)
}
,
(13)
where κl is the maximum possible parameter estimation error
κl , max
ϑx,l∈Θˆl
(‖ϑx,l − ϑˆx,l(k)‖) . (14)
The threshold derivation for sensor faults is similar and will not be repeated
here.
It is worth noting that the threshold equation of (13) guarantees that
if the s–th fault φx,s ∈ z1 occurs and is learned by its FIE successfully,
that residual is guaranteed to be bounded by its threshold. If at least one
component of all the other FIE residuals exceeds its corresponding threshold,
then the s–th fault will be successfully isolated.
3.2. Signal-based fault diagnosis for the mooring lines
Detecting and isolating faults inz2 which are associated with the mooring
system may prove to be difficult using the model-based approach of previ-
ous subsection. In particular, it can be verified that for realistic values of
the FOWT and mooring lines parameters, such faults do not fulfil the de-
tectability and isolability conditions stated in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2
of Ferrari et al. [24]. To cope with the faults in the mooring system, a signal-
based scheme is proposed, which takes advantage of the noticeable influence
that such faults have on the spectrum of the tower-top acceleration α¨.
Remark 1. Although the mooring line faults can be identified from the plat-
form motions or mooring line tensions, the measurement of these signals are
expensive. Furthermore, the accuracy of the floater motion measurement is
still questionable, as it should be further validated [37].
In comparison, the measurement of the tower-top vibration is a proven
technique, which has been widely used in wind farms. Based on the tower-top
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acceleration frequency analysis, two representative mooring line faults will
be identified. Such a mixed model and signal-based architecture allows to
detect and isolate all the considered faults, without requiring the installation
of additional, platform-motions or mooring-lines specific sensors.
In the present study, STFT [38] is utilized to transform the time series of
the tower-top acceleration α¨ as
Sα¨(τ, w) =
+∞∑
k=−∞
α¨(k)h(k − τ)e−jwk , (15)
where Sα¨ is the time-frequency spectrum of α¨, while τ and w denote,
respectively, the transformed time and angular frequency coordinates. Fur-
thermore, h(k) is a window determining the time and frequency resolution.
Using either experimental or simulation data, several training spectra
Slα¨,q(τ, w) are obtained, with q = 1, . . . , Q. The quantity Q indicates the
total number of training spectra for each hypothesis, the possible hypotheses
being either healthy conditions (l = 0), a fairlead fault (l = 10) or an anchor
fault (l = 11). In order to detect and isolate mooring lines faults, the KNN
algorithm [39] is run on the distance between the training spectra Slα¨,q(τ, w)
and the actual one Sα¨(τ, w) as
DlK,q(τ) =
√√√√ P∑
p=1
(
Sα¨(τ, wp)− Slα¨,q(τ, wp)
)2
, (16)
where wp with p = 1, . . . , P denotes one frequency bin3. After selecting
the neighborhood size K, faults can be detected and isolated by the major-
ity voting criterion [40], where the widely-used rule K ≤ √Q is employed
following [40].
4. Case Study and Comparison
The effectiveness of the proposed mixed FD architecture is verified via a
case study based on the newly developed 10MW FOWT benchmark. Follow-
ing the case study, the comparisons between the developed architecture and
3As the STFT is computed using the discrete fast Fourier transform, only a discrete
number of frequency bins are available.
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other two classical approaches reported in literature are carried out. The ad-
vantages and limitations of the proposed mixed FD architecture are discussed
based on the comparison results.
4.1. Model configuration
The aero-hydro-structural dynamics of the 10MW FOWT benchmark are
simulated by a modified version of FAST v8.16 [20]. It is noted that the
open-sourced code of FAST is extended by the authors to incorporate all the
faults defined in Table 3. Such a customized FAST code is thus embedded in
Simulink and connected to external blocks implementing the basic controllers,
actuators and the turbine’s sensors, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 2.
In total, seven Load Cases (LCs) considering laminar and turbulent wind
conditions and irregular waves are simulated in the 10MW FOWT bench-
mark, as shown in Table 5. In the first three LCs, a constant wind speed
(Um) of, respectively, 12m/s, 16m/s and 20 m/s is assumed at the hub height.
Regarding LC4-LC6, a three-dimensional turbulent varying wind field, which
is produced by the TurbSim4 tool, is considered. In addition to these cases
above the rated wind speed (11.4m/s), a wind condition of 8m/s which is
below the rated value, is considered in LC7. In details, it can be described
as,
Uw(k) = Um + Uf (k) , (17)
where the constant wind speed Um is used to specify the normal wind profile
and Uf is a fluctuating wind component calculated from the Normal Turbu-
lence Model (NTM) [41]. NTM is based on the Kaimal turbulence model
according to the turbulence intensities specified in the IEC with class C.
In addition, the wave conditions are computed using the JONSWAP wave
spectrum model. The significant wave heightHs and peak-spectral period Tp
in all LCs are predicted by the conditional probabilistic distribution derived
from the long-term observation campaigns in the North Sea [42]. In each LC,
the simulation lasts 1000s at a fixed discrete time step of Ts = 0.01s. In total,
11 faulty scenarios are simulated during each LC, as described in Table 4. In
particular, the magnitude of f1−f8 are extracted from the literature [16, 27].
4TurbSim: a stochastic inflow turbulence tool to generate realistic turbulent wind fields.
https://nwtc.nrel.gov/TurbSim.
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Table 4: Fault scenarios in the case study.
Number Description Parameter Time
Fault case A
f1 Generator speed 0.95 210 s− 235 s
f2 Generator power 1.1 305 s− 330 s
f3 Blade root bending moment 104 kN m 400 s− 425 s
f4 Rotor speed 1.1 495 s− 520 s
f5 Pitch actuator 0.2 rad 590 s− 615 s
f6 Torque actuator 20 kN m 685 s− 710 s
f7 Pitch sensor 0.2 rad 780 s− 805 s
f8 Torque sensor 0.9 875 s− 900 s
f9 Rotor blade sudden fault c=0.2 970 s− 1000 s
Fault case B
f10 Mooring line (fairlead) 0N 300 s− 1000 s
Fault case C
f11 Mooring line (anchor) 150m 300 s− 1000 s
Table 5: Wind and wave conditions in seven LCs.
LC Wind condition Um (m/s) Hs (m) Tp (s)
1 Laminar 12 2.66 7.424 Turbulent
2 Laminar 16 3.78 7.805 Turbulent
3 Laminar 20 5.13 8.476 Turbulent
7 Laminar, below rated value 8 1.69 7.28
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4.2. Model-based FD for the turbine system
For the purpose of developing the FDAE and FIEs in the model-based
FD scheme, the linear model is obtained via the subspace identification.
The normal operating condition of the 10MW FOWT benchmark, which
is articulated in section 2, is simulated via the extended FAST code to pro-
duce data in healthy conditions for subspace identification at a reduced time
step of 20 × Ts = 0.2s. In order to guarantee the persistent excitation of
the system dynamics, the generalized binary noise [43] is added into the in-
put pitch angle and generator torque (θin and Tg,in) corresponding to steady
state conditions at each of LCs. Then, the subspace identification procedure
[34] is performed to obtain the linear model of the 10MW FOWT benchmark.
Figs. 3-4 shows the results of the subspace identification run in lami-
nar wind condition (LC1) and turbulent wind condition (LC4). The perfor-
mance of the subspace identification is evaluated by checking the Variance-
Accounted-For (VAF) [44]. It can be seen that all the VAFs of the identified
system in LC1 and LC4 are higher than 86% and 74%, which indicate that
the predicted value from the linear system is an acceptable match for the
real signals. Compared to LC1, it shows that the VAFs of the generator
speed, bending moment and rotor speed in LC4 are lower. One plausible
explanation is that the high-frequency turbulence can not be fully captured
by the linearized model. Despite of such a deviation in the high frequency
region, it is considered that the performance of the subspace identification
is acceptable in both laminar and turbulent wind conditions. Other plots of
the subspace identifications in LCs 2-3 and 5-7 show similar patterns and are
thereby omitted for the sake of brevity.
Based on the derived linear model and on a discrete time step of 20×Ts =
0.2s, the simulation results of the FDAE in LC1 are presented in Fig. 5 for
discussions. In general, it is noticeable that the faults f1-f9 are detected suc-
cessfully in LC1 as the residuals in faulty scenarios exceed the corresponding
thresholds, which indicate the effectiveness of the proposed FDAE. In addi-
tion to these actuator and sensor faults, the structural fault, namely the rotor
blade fault in the simulation time of 970s to 1000s, is successfully detected
by the proposed mixed FD architecture.
Compared to the laminar wind condition in LC1, a much more significant
disturbance is found in the residuals of LC4 due to the turbulent wind, ac-
cording to Fig. 6. In general, most of faults can be detected successfully by
the proposed mixed FD architecture, except for some detection delay for f3
and f9. One plausible explanation is such a bending moment fault is buried
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Figure 3: Results of the subspace identification in LC1.(a) Generator speed, VAF: 86%,
(b) Generator power, VAF: 96%, (c) Bending moment, VAF: 86%, (d) Rotor speed, VAF:
86%.
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Figure 4: Results of the subspace identification in LC4.(a) Generator speed, VAF: 77%,
(b) Generator power, VAF: 96%, (c) Bending moment, VAF: 74%, (d) Rotor speed, VAF:
75%.
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Figure 5: Residual generation and model-based fault detection in LC1. Light grey shadow
indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a) Generator
speed, (b) Generator power, (c) Bending moment, (d) Rotor speed, (e) Pitch angle, (f)
Generator torque.
22
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(a)
10-6
10-3
10-1
101
Ge
ne
ra
to
r s
pe
ed
 (r
pm
)
Residual Threshold
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(b)
10-7
10-4
10-1
101
Ge
ne
ra
to
r p
ow
er
 (k
W
)
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(c)
10-5
10-3
10-1
101
Be
nd
ing
 m
om
en
t (
kN
 m
)
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(d)
10-6
10-3
10-1
101
Ro
to
r s
pe
ed
 (r
pm
)
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(e)
10-6
10-3
10-1
101
Pi
tch
 a
ng
le 
(°
)
200 400 600 800 1000
Time (s)
(f)
10-4
10-2
100
102
Ge
ne
ra
to
r t
or
qu
e 
(k
N 
m
)
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9
Figure 6: Residual generation and model-based fault detection in LC4. Light grey shadow
indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a) Generator
speed, (b) Generator power, (c) Bending moment, (d) Rotor speed, (e) Pitch angle, (f)
Generator torque.
in the fluctuations in the output signals due to the drastic turbulence and
high wind speeds, and as such is too small to be detected.
Similar results are obtained for other LCs, and are summarized in Table 6.
In order to easily quantify detection robustness, an indicator called Maximum
Ratio between Residuals and Thresholds (MRRT) is introduced. An MRRT
is larger than 1 means that for at least one sample the residual exceeds the
threshold: a higher MRRT implies that the FD architecture has a better
fault detection capability as it is more likely to be able to detect and isolate
smaller faults.
Compared to laminar wind conditions, it can be seen from Table 6 that
MRRT in turbulent wind conditions (LC4-LC6) is much lower than in lami-
nar ones. Particularly, the MRRT in LC4 is lower than LC1 by ∼ 49%, which
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Table 6: MRRT of the proposed FD architecture in seven LCs.
LC1 LC2 LC3 LC4 LC5 LC6 LC7
f1 24.7 1.5 6.7 2.4 1.1 1.1 25.9
f2 50.5 7.5 7.9 20.2 8.1 1.9 16.7
f3 21.3 1.7 3.2 1.0 1.5 1.0 5.9
f4 11.1 3.2 12.5 3.4 1.6 1.2 50.5
f5 26.1 3.4 44.9 11.7 14.8 34.3 61.4
f6 2.7 9.6 5.0 4.0 1.8 1.5 58.9
f7 6.5 1.7 6.7 6.0 2.7 11.9 10.9
f8 1.5 1.8 4.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8
f9 32.6 1.7 5.9 2.0 1.0 1 .0 7.3
can be explained by the fact that the wind turbulence will cause the FOWT
to operate more frequently away from the operating point around which the
dynamics used by the FDAE have been linearized. It induces significant non-
linear effects on the mixed FD architecture and reduces the fault detection
capability. However, some values in LC4-LC6 are higher than in correspond-
ing laminar wind conditions, such as f6 in LC4, f2, f5 and f7 in LC5 and
f7 in LC6. One plausible explanation is that in some cases the additional
uncertainty due to the wind turbulence may instead positively interfere with
the other components affecting the residual and make it larger, thus easing
detection. Regarding LC7 below the rated wind speed, the proposed FD
architecture in general shows similar results as in LC1 above the value one. It
is interesting to note that f8 is hard to be detected in this case, which shows
a lower MRRT in LC7. The reason for this is that the generator torque in
this case is smaller than the rated value. This makes the scaling sensor fault
of the torque too small to be detected.
After a successful fault detection, a bank of FIEs is activated for the
isolation step. More specifically, 8 FIEs are employed to match the structured
faults (f1-f8) within z1, while fault f9, being unstructured, is learned by the
general adaptive approximator of the FDAE.
In detail, the FDAE approximator φˆ0 in eq. (7) is enabled to approximate
the unknown faults and unstructured component faults. It is based on a
6-input, 20-output RBF neural network with one hidden layer of 60 fixed
neurons covering all the admissible values for state and input variables. ϑˆ0
will have 20·60 components containing the weights by which the hidden layer
outputs are linearly combined to calculate the network output.
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Figure 7: Comparisons between measurements and FDAE outputs in LC1. Light grey
shadow indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a)
Generator speed, (b) Generator power, (c) Bending moment, (d) Rotor speed.
By including the approximation of the neural network, the results of
FDAE in LC1 is presented in Fig. 7. It can be seen that such an unstructured
blade fault in f9 is eventually learned successfully by the online adaptive
approximator φˆ0. Anyway, some deviations between the measurements and
FDAE are observed during 970s-990s due to the oscillating behaviour of the
neural network output, which is induced by the learning law and partially
illustrated in Fig. 8.
In addition to f9, other faults (f1 − f8) are isolated by the designed
FIEs. Fig. 9 shows the results of the fault isolation and the approximated
fault function of the sensor fault (f2) in LC2. It is worth nothing that f2 is
isolated at the early stage of the fault scenario (306s), since only the residuals
produced by the FIE #2 are within the range specified by the corresponding
thresholds. The residuals from other FIEs(#1, #3 and #4) exceed their
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Figure 8: Approximation (first 6 outputs) of the RBF neural network in LC1. Light grey
shadow indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a)
φˆ0(1), (b) φˆ0(2), (c) φˆ0(3), (d) φˆ0(4), (e) φˆ0(5), (f) φˆ0(6).
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thresholds due to the mismatch between these FIEs and the fault function.
After 330s, the residuals from FIEs (#1, #3 and #4) reduce gradually due
to the recovered nominal healthy condition of the FOWT. In addition, the
actual fault function of f2, which essentially is a multiplicative fault as shown
in Table 3, is successfully approximated according to Fig. 9(e-f). It should
be noted that FIE #2 slightly underestimates the actual fault function at
the beginning (305s-311s) according to Fig. 9(e). After that, the real value
of the fault is gradually approximated by FIE #2.
Similarly, the isolation results of the actuator fault (f6) in LC2 and the
sensor fault (f4) in LC4 are presented in Figs. 10-11. It is concluded that
both the additive fault function of the generator torque and multiplicative
fault function of the rotor speed, are gradually learned by FIE#6 and FIE#4.
This verifies the effectiveness of the fault isolation capability of the proposed
mixed FD architecture.
4.3. Signal-based FD for the mooring lines
Regarding the signal-based FD for the two representative mooring line
faults in z2, the Hamming window function [45] is used for computing STFT
and obtain the training spectral pattern of α¨ in healthy and faulty conditions.
The length of the moving Hamming window is 1000 samples while the overlap
between consecutive windows is 10 samples. The length of the fast Fourier
transform, on the other hand, is 2000 samples. During the KNN classifica-
tion, P , Q and K in eq. (16) are set to be 1000, 64 and 8, respectively.
Based on eqs. (15)-(16), some selected FD results of the mooring line
faults are presented in Figs. 12-13 for discussion. In general, KNNs derived
from the distance between the spectral patterns and the measurement output
are able to indicate the state of the mooring lines. Both mooring line faults
are successfully detected and isolated at around 310s when the neighbors of
the faulty signals indicate the FOWT benchmark violating nominal healthy
conditions. Moreover, it is evident from Figs. 12-13 that the detection delay
time [10] is around 10s, which is dependent on the moving Hamming window
length utilized in the Fourier transform. Considering the time windows uti-
lized in the transform (1000× Ts), such a detection time is acceptable. It is
worth noting that the FD results in the turbulent wind condition (LC4) show
similar patterns as the laminar one (LC1), which indicates the robustness of
the signal-based scheme in the proposed mixed FD architecture.
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Figure 9: Fault isolation for the sensor fault (f2) in LC2. Light grey shadow indicates the
fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a) FIE #2, component
1, (b) FIE #3, component1, (c) FIE #4, component 1, (d) FIE #5, component 1, (e)
Approximated fault function, (f) Approximated parameter.
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Figure 10: Fault isolation for the actuator fault (f6) in LC2. Light grey shadow indicates
the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a) FIE #2, component
2, (b) FIE #3, component 2, (c) FIE #4, component 2, (d) FIE #6, component 1, (e)
Approximated fault function, (f) Approximated parameter.
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Figure 11: Fault isolation for the actuator fault (f4) in LC4. Light grey shadow indicates
the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4. (a) FIE #2, component
4, (b) FIE #3, component 4, (c) FIE #4, component 4, (d) FIE #6, component 4, (e)
Approximated fault function, (f) Approximated parameter.
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Figure 12: Norm of the distance between the spectral patterns and the measurement
output and KNN for the signal-based FD of the mooring line faults in LC3 (K = 8). Light
grey shadow indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4.
(a) Top segment fault. (b) Bottom segment fault.
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Figure 13: Norm of the distance between the spectral patterns and the measurement
output and KNN for the signal-based FD of the mooring line faults in LC4 (K = 8). Light
grey shadow indicates the fault scenarios corresponding to the fault time in the Table 4.
(a) Top segment fault. (b) Bottom segment fault.
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4.4. Comparison to other approaches
In order to illustrate the advantages and limitations of the proposed mixed
FD architecture, two classical approaches, which have been developed by
previous researchers, are implemented for the 10MW FOWT benchmark re-
ported in the present study. Briefly, both of them are introduced here.
1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA): this well–known technique em-
ploys an orthogonal transformation to convert a series of correlated
variables into linearly uncorrelated variables. Krüger et al. [46], Pozo
et al. [47] and Wang et al. [48] employed such a PCA-based approach
to detect and identify faults in wind turbines.
2. Dynamic Principal Component Analysis (DPCA): The DPCA approach
uses the time-lagged version of the system input and output to develop
a model for monitoring purposes, and has been widely used for the
fault detection of dynamic systems [46, 48]. Rato and Reis [49] es-
tablished the DPCA model based on decorrelated residuals to detect
several faults and illustrated the reliability of such an approach in the
fault detection.
In order to provide detection data for comparisons, both of aforemen-
tioned two classical approaches, PCA [48] and DPCA [49] are implemented
and applied to detect faults in the 10MW FOWT benchmark. Comparisons
between the mixed FD architecture developed in the present study and these
two classical approaches are carried out. The FD results are summarized in
Table 7.
It is discerned that the proposed mixed FD architecture detected most
expected faults in laminar wind conditions (LC1-LC3 and LC7), except for
some detection delay on f1, f3, f8, f10 and f11 and missed detection on f8 in
the case below the rated wind speed. However, the classical PCA and DPCA
have missed detection in LC2, LC3 and LC7 several times. Under turbulent
wind conditions (LC4-LC6), the mixed FD architecture had more detection
delay for f1, f3 − f4, f6, f8 − f11. PCA failed to detect f1, f3 − f4, f10 − f11
and was not always able to detect f9. DPCA instead failed to detect f1,
f3 − f4, f7, f10 − f11 and was inconsistent in detecting f2, f6 and f8 − f9,
thus seeming the less reliable method for detecting faults in turbulent wind
conditions.
Based on these comparisons, it is concluded that the proposed mixed FD
architecture has the best performance in detecting the considered faults in
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Table 7: Fault detection results of three architectures, where
√
is accurate detection, ◦ is
delay detection with more than one sample, × is missed detection).
LC Mixed FD PCA DPCA1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
f1
√ ◦ √ √ ◦ ◦ √ √ ◦ × × × × √ √ ◦ × × × × ×
f2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ◦ √ √ √ × √ ◦ √ × √ √ ×
f3
√ ◦ √ ◦ ◦ ◦ √ √ √ √ × ◦ × √ √ √ √ × ◦ × √
f4
√ √ √ √ √ ◦ √ √ √ √ × ◦ × √ √ √ ◦ × √ × √
f5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ◦ ◦ ◦ × √ √ × √ √ ◦ × √ √
f6
√ √ √ √ √ ◦ √ √ ◦ ◦ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ ◦ √
f7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ √ √ ◦ √ × × × √
f8
√ ◦ ◦ √ ◦ ◦ × √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ◦ √ × √ ◦ ×
f9
√ √ √ ◦ √ ◦ √ √ √ √ ◦ × × √ ◦ × √ ◦ × × √
f10 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
f11 ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×
all load cases, despite the fact it needs further improvement to detect f8 in
the wind case below the rated value (LC7) and to reduce detection delay in
some fault scenarios.
5. Conclusions
FOWTs operate in the hostile marine environment with restricted ac-
cessibility and maintainability. Currently, there is no all-encompassing FD
architecture deployed on FOWTs. Such an absence poses a big challenge to
reliability engineers and may potentially lead to increased O&M costs. In this
paper, a mixed FD architecture is established by integrating a model-based
and a signal-based scheme to detect and isolate a mix of critical faults for
FOWTs. In order to verify the developed mixed FD architecture, a 10MW
FOWT benchmark, including specific predefined faults, is developed by ex-
tending the widely-used FAST code. In particular, the structural faults of
the rotor blades and of the mooring lines, for the first time, are taken into
account for the FD purpose. While the model-based scheme is used to de-
tect and isolate the actuator and sensor faults, the signal-based scheme is
mainly used to detect the faults associated with the mooring lines, using
only existing available measurements.
In order to illustrate the advantages of the proposed mixed FD archi-
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tecture, comparisons are drawn with the two other classic signal-based FD
approaches: PCA and DPCA. When comparing the detection and isolation
of faults, results show that the proposed mixed FD architecture is able to
detect and isolate critical FOWT faults in different load cases effectively.
Compared to two classical PCA and DPCA approaches, the proposed mixed
FD architecture has the best performance in fault detection of FOWTs in
realistic wind and wave conditions.
Even though this approach shows promising results, some limitations are
still lingering. For instance, it does not take into account the isolation of
the unstructured fault. In addition, the fault detection robustness, which is
affected by the wind turbulence, should be further investigated.
Based on these discussions, it is suggested that in the future the architec-
ture could be extended by including a reduced-order nonlinear physical model
of the 10MW FOWT benchmark, as well as a more general fault model and
the capability to do fault isolation for unstructured faults. In addition, the
proposed mixed FD architecture can be tailored to other types of FOWTs,
such as Spar type, tension leg platform type of FOWTs. Furthermore, it can
be also extended to bottom-fixed wind turbines. Moreover, fault tolerant
control design for the 10MW FOWT benchmark should be investigated by
combining the proposed mixed FD architecture with fault accommodation
techniques.
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